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Abstract
We offer an analysis of the American Revolution in which actors are modeled
as choosing the sovereign organization that maximizes their net expected benefits.
Benefits of secession derive from satisfaction of greed and settlement of grievance.
Costs derive from the cost of civil war and lost benefit of Empire membership.
When expected net benefits are positive for both secessionists and the Empire civil
war ensues, otherwise it is settled or never begins in the first place. The novelty of
our discussion is to show how diverse economic and non-economic factors (such
as pamphleteering by Thomas Paine and the morale of the Revolutionary forces)
can be integrated into a single economic model.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: F5, K33, N40, P48
Keywords: American Revolution, autonomous regions, causes of war, civil
war, collapse of empire, empire, international borders, secession, self determination, theory of history, transaction costs, war of secession

1: Introduction
A fair assessment of the extensive research on the causes of the American Revolution is
that greed and grievance were elemental. With respect to the former, economic historians
estimate that the gain to be had from secession from the British Empire was about one to
two percent of income per annum.1 Grievance was also a motivating force – especially
American grievances against the raft of badly judged Parliamentary legislation after
1763.

Economic benefit and grievance can be treated similarly as encompassing the expected
gross benefit of secession.2 However, while greed, grievance, or, a combination was
necessary for the American Revolution, they were not sufficient. Another important
factor must have been the expected cost of a fighting a secessionist war, as well as the
secessionists’ confidence in victory – their subjective probability of a successful
prosecution of the war against the mother country. With a low probability of success,
support for war would surely have melted away; while an increasing probability would
draw more supporters to the cause. We will discuss how we think historical events
impacted the probability of secession on the part of both the colonists and the mother
country. We will also argue that the expected (probability weighted) benefit of secession

1

Economic historians estimating the economic benefits include Egnal and Ernst (1972), Harper (1942),
McClelland (1969 and 1973), Ransom (1968), Reid (1978), Thomas (1965), Walton (1971).
2
There are well known theoretical methods – willingness to pay and willingness to accept - of placing
monetary values on non-market variables – not that we will attempt any such calculations here.
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would rationally be compared with the cost of attaining that benefit – in other words, the
cost of disputing secession with the British. And, of course, this dispute cost would also
have depended upon how hard the Empire pushed back. The latter itself depending upon
complex calculations, such as the value of the American colonies to the Empire, the
probability of defeating the secessionists, and the cost of persuading them to change their
minds. We will argue that calculations on variables such as the foregoing as well as
others, and as expressed in the ‘equations of secession’ set out in the next section, almost
certainly fluctuated during the six years of Revolutionary war. Indeed, using the
terminology set out below, round about 1750 ‘tranquility’ reigned between the mother
country and its American colonies, tipped into civil war in 1775 (at Lexington), and at the
end of the struggle tipped again into a secession in 1783 with the Treaty of Paris.

In what follows we do not offer new historical ‘facts’, rather our endeavor is to
reinterpret known ‘facts’ in terms of the economic model of historical sequences set out
in Hallwood (2007). This economic modeling is based on the following notions.
Decisions taken by non-state actors to fight wars of secession are treated as a non-market
investment choice that can be subjected to benefit-cost analysis.3 Benefits take the form
of the expected return on independence, and this has to be compared with dispute costs in
cases where a prospective secession is resisted by the union. Likewise, the union has to
3

Using rational choice theory to model non-state actor behavior is not new as many analyses of treaty
formation attest – see, for example, Barrett (2003), Goldsmith and Posner (2005) and Keohane (2005).
Extending rational choice theory to sub-national decision-makers is a logical extension and has been
addressed by, for example, Collier and Hoeffer (2000), Collier and Sambanis (2005), and Grossman (1999).
In the former paper, sub-national decision-makers are warlords and their followers who expect to gain
financially from secession. In that model wider national, societal, cultural, religious or ethnic grievances
are of secondary concern. However, as Marshall and Gurr (2005) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003)
show, frequently these latter factors are motivational. Young (2002) advances the argument that both
economic (or, ‘material’) factors and political factors enter into a secessionist’s utility function, but that
economic factors predominate in peaceful secessions.
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compare benefits and costs of resisting secession. As shown in Hallwood (2007) the
underlying model yields a set of historically stable equilibriums and one of transitional,
or, temporary, equilibrium. Movement between these equilibriums yields a rich dynamic
of historical sequences. In this paper we set the model against the facts of the American
Revolution and, we think, turn up new insights. Indeed, the ‘equations of secession’ are
quite general in that they can be applied to any war of secession, including the American
Civil War and the many ongoing wars of secession in the world today.4

Thus, using this methodology, we are able to integrate various historical events into a
general economic model. Events such as the ebb and flow of battle and the
pamphleteering of people such as Thomas Paine are readily understood within the model.
We readily admit that we gloss over myriad details turned up by historians. However, as
long as one accepts the notion that the secessionists and the Empire were rational
calculators (probably implicitly and with imperfect information) of their net interests in
promoting or opposing secession we are confident that overlooked facts will not
invalidate our conceptualization of the historical episode under investigation.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the economic model;
section 3 discusses historical events in terms of the model; and section 4 draws
conclusions.

4

For a listing of ongoing wars of secession see Marshall and Gurr (2005).
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2: Equations of secession

A simplified union
Imagine a “union” – a sovereign of two or more sub-regions. It could be a voluntary
union of countries, or it could be an empire (defined as a union where membership of at
least one sub-region is not entirely voluntary). The inhabitants of the different regions in
the union see themselves as different from one another. The differences arise from their
different histories stemming from many possible sources - different languages, religions,
race, social, legal, and economic institutions, and cultures. In figure 1 the union X has
three sub-regions A, B and C. Such a union in the mid-eighteenth century was Great
Britain, its 13 American colonies and Canada.
The union X
Region B

Region A Region C

Figure 1: A union composed of three regions
A sub-region will rationally wish to secede from the union X if expected benefits from
gaining independence exceed the cost of creating its own sovereignty.

What exactly the benefits of sovereignty are thought to be is likely to vary from case to
case. We examine the secession of the 13 colonies in section 3. The supposed benefits are
held in the minds of ‘nationalists’5 – meaning those people who identify themselves with
5

Or, “expansionists” to use the terminology of Egnal (1988).
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a region rather than with the union as a whole. We define these benefits as the ‘economic
rent of sovereignty’. “Economic rent” is perhaps not the best term that could be used but
it does indicate a surplus enjoyed by some group, in its original usage by owners of land,
which is apposite in the current context.

We assume that a union’s and one or more of its sub-region’s interests are synonymous
with the interests of the respective political leaderships.6 A political leadership may
attempt to identify its interests with the interests of the wider citizenry that it weighs in
some way. The less democratic is a country or sub-region the greater is likely to be the
gap between the interests of the political leadership and those of the rest of the citizens.7

A secessionist’s maximization problem
The expected benefit at time, t, for a secessionist group – in region B for arguments sake,
of breaking away from a union is:

( prt ($rent )t (1 − pr )t $ xt
+
)
(1 + r )t
(1 + r )t
Where E(economic rent B) is the expected present value of economic rent with
(1)

T

E (economic.rentB) = ∑t =1 (

independence less any economic rent that would have been available had B remained in
the union; prt is the subjective probability of gaining sovereignty in any given year t =
1…T; therefore, (1 - prt ) is the probability of not having gained sovereignty in year t; r is

6

Here we follow Goldsmith and Posner (2005). The context of the 13 colonies historians have identified
the political leaders as being drawn from an ‘elite’ of wealthy merchants and plantation owners.
7
On this see Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
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the decision-makers’ weighted average rate of time preference8; $rent is the annual rent
that would be earned if sovereignty was won. This value is expressed in monetary terms
but it could also be written in terms of utility; $x is economic rent if B does not gain
sovereignty, so remaining in the union.

The numerical value of the terms in equation (1) may change over time. The probability
of winning sovereign rights, prt, changes with circumstances – for example, if the
commitment of the representatives of the union X to sustaining the union is thought to
have weakened, prt may increase. The rate of time preference, r, may change if, for
various reasons, secession is thought to have become more or less urgent in the minds of
decision-makers. And annual economic rents under the different regimes, respectively,
$rentt and $xt, may change.

If separation is not agreed with the union, nationalists in region B may continue to press
for secession. But there is a cost of maintaining a dispute.9 The expected discounted
present value of dispute cost is:

T

(2)

E (dispute. cos t ) = ∑ (
t =1

(1 − pr ) t ($dispute cos t ) t
)
(1 + r ) t

8

There is no need here to take sides on whether or not decision-makers apply a constant rate of discount
across relevant future time periods. For a discussion of choice of discount rate in an international relations
context see Streich and Levy (2007).
9
Secession is a legal step in international law but transaction cost is incurred in getting to make this step.
The latter observation differentiates our work from that of Alesina and Spolaore (2003) on the optimal
number of countries - as they implicitly assume a frictionless world. Indeed, transaction costs are
endogenous to historical sequences with either side in a secessionist dispute attempting to minimize its own
while increasing those of the adversary.
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Where (1 - pr)t is again the subjective probability of not having sovereignty in any given
year, t, in which case an annual dispute cost is incurred. These costs may be low – just
the cost of a negotiating team. But they could be substantial – as when military conflict
breaks out.

The net advantage to B of continuing a secessionist dispute is:

(3)

E(net economic rent)B = E(economic rent B) – E(dispute cost)

Or,
E(NER)B = (equation 1) – (equation 2).

(4)

B has to choose between pursuing sovereignty, or, remaining as a part of the union. This
depends, respectively, upon whether E(NER)B is positive or negative.

The union’s maximization problem
The government of the union X has a different set of calculations to make. It has to
consider the return it gets from retaining B in the union in comparison with the cost of
persuading B to remain a part of it. At time t, X’s expected economic rent derived from
retaining B in the union is:

(1 − Prt )($ RENT )t Prt $ yt
+
)
(1 + i )t
(1 + i )t
Where Prt is X’s subjective probability of B seceding (and may be different from prt
(5)

J

E (economic.rentX ) = ∑t =1 (

which is B’s subjective probability of secession). ($RENT)t is economic rent earned by X
with B in the union, and $yt is the economic rent that it may earn if B secedes. Finally, i
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is X’s rate of time preference. It is reasonable to assume that ($RENT)t is greater than
$yt, perhaps substantially so, as with B in the union the union can tax resource rents in B,
while it cannot do so once B has seceded.

X incurs a cost of persuading B to remain within the union. Persuasion cost could be the
extra subsidies, possibly in the form of reduced taxes, given by the union to B in an effort
to make remaining in the union favorable for B. Also included in persuasion cost is
military expenditure by the union – such as the stationing troops in B - as is typical of
imperial powers.

Persuasion cost is:

J

(6)

E ( persuasion cos t ) = ∑ (
t =1

(1 − Pr)t ($ persuasion cos t )t
)
(1 + i )t

From X’s point of view, the net benefit, E(NER)X, of B remaining in the union is
equation (5) minus equation (6), viz:

(7)

E(NER)X = (equation 5) – (equation 6)

E(NER)X is used in the analysis of whether X will agree to secession and sovereignty for
B. Which it will do if E(NER)X is negative – secession occurs; or, whether secession will
be resisted - E(NER)X is positive.

9

The payoffs in figure 2 for the two pairs of strategies are the present value of expected
net economic rents, E(NER)B and E(NER)X. The payoffs in the lower left of each box are
those for the union, X, and those in the upper right those sub-region B.

SUB-REGION B
Secession Preferred
Prefer Union with X
E(NER)B > 0

Secession
Resisted

UNION X

War of secession

E(NER)X > 0

Empire

E(NER)X > 0
E(NER)B > 0

Secession
Not resisted

E(NER)B < 0

Non-resisted sécession

E(NER)X < 0

E(NER)B < 0
Tranquility

E(NER)X < 0

Figure 2: To secede or not to secede?
The four boxes in figure 2 define four historical phases: a tranquil union, a stable empire,
a war of secession and a non-resisted secession. Thus,

1) In the southeast box the net reward for pressing for secession is negative for subnational unit B, and in any event union X would not resist as its persuasion cost of
retaining B in the union is greater than the benefit of doing so. Both B and X
prefer continuation of the union. Tranquility reigns.10
2) In the northeast box expected net economic rent is positive for the union but
negative for B. This is the case of stable empire. B, with negative E(NER)B, does

10

Forms of government found in each box include tranquility in a unitary state – a state with a central
government with power devolved downward but answerable to it; federal states such as the USA and
Germany; a commonwealth of largely independent states (as with the British Commonwealth); and in
earlier times, intermarriage between kingdoms aimed at sealing alliances.

10

not have sufficient motivation to try to secede, and X, with E(NER)X > 0, would
resist secession if B were to demand to do so.
3) The northwest box has E(NER)B and E(NER)X > 0 for both parties. This is the
case of a ’war of secession’. Region B has the motivation to secede and X has the
motivation to resist.11
4) The southwest box shows the case of peaceful, or, non-resisted, secession as
region B desires to secede (E(NER)B is positive) and X has no desire to resist
secession (E(NER)X being negative). Secessions in democratic countries are
likely to be of this kind.12

Both tranquility and empire can be thought of as historical equilibriums in the sense that
they may persist for a long time. War of secession is a transitional phase. Even so,
empires do not last forever, nor must tranquility, and wars of secession can last for
generations.

Drivers of historical sequences
The argument above is that historical sequences are driven by combination of expected
net economic rents between sub-national unit B and union X of which B is a part. There
are 6 terms in equations (1) and (2) all relating to region B; and another 6 in equations
(5) and (6) relating to the union X. These are summarized in Table 1.

11

Walter (2001) notes that between 1940 and 1996 there were 72 civil wars and that in a large number of
these conflict was over the division of territory. Secessionist war may be aimed by B at having greater
access to state power – what Gurr (2000) calls ‘ethnic rebellion’, or they may be wars of self-determination
– creation of an independent state – as with the American Revolution.
12
And they are the sole type (implicitly) discussed in Alesina and Spolaore (2003).
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TABLE 1: FUNDAMENTAL DRIVERS OF HISTORICAL SEQUENCES

Elements in the calculation of Region B’s
expected net economic rent: E(NER)B
1. ($dispute cost)t : B’s cost of
disputing sovereignty with the
union in period t
2. ($rent)t : return to B with
independence in period t
3. prt: B’s subjective probability of
secession in period t. Or, (1 - prt )t :
B’s subjective probability of
secession not occurring in period t
4. r : B’s rate of time preference
5. $xt : return to B it if remains in the
union in period t
6. T: B’s forward looking time scale

Elements in the calculation of union X’s
expected net economic rent: E(NER)X
1. ($persuasion cost)t : the union’s
cost of persuading B to remain in
the union at time t
2. ($RENT)t : X’s return with B in the
union in period t
3. Prt :the union’s subjective
probability of B seceding in period
t. Or, (1 – Pr)t : union’s subjective
probability of B not seceding in
period t
4. i : union’s rate of time preference
5. $yt : return to X if B leaves the
union in period t
6. J: X’s forward looking time scale

We turn now to a justification of the forgoing economic model by applying it to the
American Revolution. We will explain how various historical events apply to the
variables listed in the preceding equations and in Table 1. It will be shown how the signs
and relative balance of the equations shifted over time - until war became inevitable; and
then how during the course of the war the equations shifted again leading to a state of
peace and a new stable equilibrium.

Section 3: The American Revolution

The American Revolution and the events leading up to it is, to say the least, complex with
historians offering several different schools of thought.13 Here we discuss what we think
are the major causal events. The British Empire will be the Union X, and the 13
American colonies Region B – a sub-part of the Empire.

13

For brief summaries of these see Egnal and Ernst (1972) and Egnal (1988).
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Circa-1750: stable empire
We begin in a state of stable Empire, about 1750 – a historical equilibrium in the
northeast box of Figure 2. Britain controls the American colonies and most colonists want
to remain British. There were many reasons for this relationship of empire to be stable;
we mention only a few. The colonists liked being part of the Empire and the British liked
having the colonies. The probability of secession, prt, was therefore low, since no
political movement of any consequence was considering it – though see Egnal (1988) on
the spreading influence on the ‘expansionist’ faction that saw America better off outside
of the Empire. Secondly, dispute cost, ($dispute cost)t, was high, and persuasion cost,
($persuasion cost)t, low since, at the time, Britain had a powerful army and navy, and the
colonists had no standing military force of their own. Thirdly, the Empire protected the
colonists from encroachment by the French. Fourthly, the colonists benefit from access to
Empire markets. These features kept the return from remaining in the Empire, $x, high
and the expected return from leaving it, ($rent)t, low for the Americans. It also meant that
the return to the Empire from retaining the American colonies, ($RENT)t, was high
relative to the return that could be expected following secession, $yt. Accordingly, the
colonist’s net economic rent, E(NER)B, was negative; the benefits of staying in the
Empire far outweighed any cost of trying to break free. The Empire enjoyed positive
economic rent, E(NER)X, because it was a great benefit to have the colonies and the cost
of keeping them was not excessive.

13

Economic factors in secession – a brief examination
Several economic factors are identified by Egnal and Ernst (1972) as causal: increasing
real debt burdens in the post-1763 recession, interference by Parliament in the colonies’
monetary arrangements, and penetration by British merchants in both the northern and
southern colonies in markets hitherto the preserve of colonial merchants and planters. As
they say: “The consciousness of a clash of interests made the merchants more aware of
the identity of economic and political goals” (p 58). In terms of our model secession was
expected to increase ($rent)t. However, they offer little or no explicit consideration of the
other variables in our model. The Parliamentary legislation that some historians have
stressed as having been an important cause of the revolution is rather set aside. This may
well be true as far as the magnitude of their effect on ($rent)t is concerned, and especially
as various Acts were quickly repealed by Parliament.14 However, our interpretation is
that the Acts did have important effects, but acting through the probability of secession,
prt, rather than ($rent)t. Indeed, Egnal and Ernst (1972) say of the ‘objectionable’
Parliamentary Acts that they “strengthened commitment to economic autonomy” (p 60).
If ‘commitment’ translates into greater willingness to sacrifice for victory, prt, had
increased.

Initial events leading to Revolution: the French and Indian war
The first major event to be considered is the French and Indian War 1754-1763.15

14

Indeed, even the Navigation Acts, in place from 1651 until the Revolution, are calculated by Thomas
(1965) to have reduced per capita income in the American colonies by less than one percent once the
benefit of British military protection is factored in. Moreover, after the defeat of the French in North
America, it can be argued that this military protection was no longer needed. In that case, the per capita
cost of the Navigation Acts on the colonists rises to only about two percent.
15
Or Seven Years War fought between the British and the French and their Indian allies,
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The victorious British chose to tax the colonies to offset their increased indebtedness
incurred in the war, so laying the groundwork for many of the conflicts between the
British and the American colonies (Rothbard, 1976, page 27-28).

On the British side of the equation the French and Indian War had several consequences.
The Empire had just spent treasure defending the colonies and had gained productive
territory in the process. In terms of equation (5) economic rent, ($RENT)t, gained from
the colonies had increased. The colonies were also a future source of taxes.

On the colonist side three factors need to be considered - the first two favoring secession,
the third working in the opposite direction. The return from remaining in the union, $xt,
may have diminished since the possibility of further conflict with the French had
decreased; and something that would be very important in the future was a reduction in
the colonist’s dispute cost, ($dispute cost)t, because the recent war had generated
experience of fighting wars.16 However, the return for the colonists outside of the union,
($rent)t, probably diminished since the Empire had expanded offering the Americans
greater trading opportunities within the union rather than outside of it. It is our judgment,
at least as far as the mid-1760s are concerned, that the effect on the probability of
secession in the eyes of the colonists, prt, had changed little, remaining negligible.

16

Indeed, George Washington himself was at the first battle of the French and Indian war and participated
throughout (Middlekauff, 2005, 58).

15

Parliamentary Acts and the growth of self-consciousness
The next major series of events to effect the equations were a series of Acts imposed
upon the colonists by the British Parliament. The most important of these were the
Stamp Act, 1765, the Quartering Act, 1765, the Townshend Acts, 1767, the Tea Act,
1773, and the Intolerable Acts, 1774. Parliament passed the Stamp Act in order to help
reduce debts incurred during the war.17 As the colonists had carried much of the burden
of fighting, at least in North America, it seemed unfair to them that they should also have
to pay for it (Thomas, 1965, 89-97, Middlekauff, 2005, 88).

The colonial reaction to the Stamp Act was staggering. The colonists, especially the
business class, were enraged. They saw no reason to have to pay for services that had
always been free. While it was claimed that the Stamp Act hindered commerce, the
bigger issue was that according to British law no one could be taxed without a
representative in Parliament, and the colonists were not directly represented in
Parliament.18 Thus, the phrase “no taxation without representation”. There were riots in
the streets, and tax collectors were hunted down. The Sons of Liberty protested the Act,
often violently (Middlekauff, 2005, page. 94).

It is our argument that the Stamp Act crisis, in drawing Americans together, had created
among them a deeper sense of a common identity. In terms of our historical model this
increased the return – as they saw it, on separating themselves from the union. That is,

17

The Stamp Act imposed on every newspaper, pamphlet, and other newly issued public and legal
documents a tax in the form of the necessity to buy a stamp.
18
There were British delegates that stood in for the colonies, but no one from the colonies themselves was
there.
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($rent)t – the return to the colonists given independence, had increased from a negligible
level, though in 1765 it was probably still rather small. We will point to other factors that
increased this sense of an American identity, especially the tracts of Thomas Paine and
letters of John Dickinson. It is also worth emphasizing that we are arguing that the
creation of a common identity must precede revolution – something that Egnal (1988)
implicitly describes in a lot of detail.

In response to the Stamp Act crisis, the British stationed extra troops in the northeastern
colonies further enraging the colonists and for two reasons. Under the Quartering Act
(1765), the colonists had to support and pay for the troops to be there, which was seen as
an unfair financial strain. Secondly, the colonists had a traditional fear of standing
armies, believing that standing armies lead to the enforcement of unfair laws and abuses
of freedom (Middlekauff, 2005, 97). Resistance to the Stamp and Quartering Acts
increased leading to the Stamp Act Congress of October 1765. For the first time the
American colonists united against what they saw as unjust policy. The Congress met to
petition the King and plead the colony’s case against the Acts. It also imposed a ban on
the importation of British goods, hoping to pressure Parliament into repealing the Acts.
Eventually the Stamp Act was repealed, but tensions worsened when, soon after,
Parliament passed the Declaratory Act. This declared that Parliament could pass and
enforce any Act or law it saw fit on the colonies. The colonists were made to feel that
they were being scolded with the result that mistrust of Britain deepened (Rothbard,
1976, 151, and Middlekauff, 2005, 111).

17

The Stamp Act crisis, and the Quartering and Declaratory Acts affected equation (1) in
several ways. On the colonist’s side, as we have said, it raised ($rent)t and lowered $xt
since secession would mean elimination of tax transfers to Britain as well as not having
to pay for quartering British troops. Secondly, the probability of secession as viewed by
the colonists, prt, probably increased a little as the benefits of secession became apparent.
Moreover, during this crisis, it can be argued, that impatience with British policy
increased – which would be reflected in a rise in the rate of time preference, r. The
importance of the latter is that it reduces the present value of the stream of expected
future benefits (which, without secession, trail off into the distant future) relative to the
present value of dispute costs, with the latter expected to be incurred only in the short
term.

The colonist’s dispute costs had probably fallen somewhat as they had for the first time
organized themselves as a counter to the union. This was of great importance because it
demonstrated that in cooperating the colonists could muster effective power. However,
in the late-1760s there was still no meaningful talk of a war of secession – in our view
mainly because dispute cost, especially military costs, remained high. At this point the
colonists were willing only to petition and protest, albeit sometimes with riots.

On Britain’s side, the rents to be extracted from the American colonies, ($RENT)t, had
increased, since taxing the colonies was thought to be an option. Persuasion costs,
($persuasion cost)t, though had increased slightly because of the extra troops needed to
quell the riots. However, these were seen as almost insignificant, especially as the

18

Quartering Act was designed to transfer this cost to the colonists themselves. The
probably of secession as viewed by Britain, Prt, must have remained low - there is no
conception of having to fight an all-out war of secession.

Our judgments is that immediately after the Stamp Act crisis in 1765 the colonists’ net
economic rent from secession, equation (3), remained negative – the benefits of secession
were still viewed as being substantially less than that the dispute costs that would be
incurred. However, a beginning had been made on changing its sign from negative to
positive – there was a lasting bitterness on the part of the colonists. The Stamp Act crisis
also created a great deal of mistrust and distance between Parliament and the 13
colonies.19

Townshend and Tea Acts: deepening of grievance and self-consciousness
Animosity deepened a year later with the passing of the Townshend Acts.20 The
colonists’ reaction was much the same as with the Stamp Act - though with more
weariness than resentment as they were drained from fighting the Stamp Act.21 However,
in Boston, rioting and harassment of customs commissioners and tax collectors persisted.
19

Since most of the variables in the equations are subjective and influenced a great deal by people’s
nationalism, beliefs and feelings, it is very important to keep these things in mind when considering how
our equations fit into history. The colonist felt that since they were geographically so far away, that the
Parliament could not know what life was like in the colonies, or what the colonists’ needs or wants were.
They also felt that it was unfair for a government thousands of miles away to enforce policies without
proper representation. Parliament on the other hand, saw no reason why the American colonies should not
be treated like any other part of the union – passing whatever laws and taxes it chose.
20
These included taxes on glass, lead, paints, paper, and tea.
21
One response was John Dickinson’s Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, which were published in all
but four colonial newspapers, in several pamphlets, and in London and Paris. The letters stated that the
Townshend Acts were an encroachment on the constitutional right of Americans, exactly as with the Stamp
Act. It also encouraged petitioning of the Crown for repeal, and continued boycotting of British goods.
These words were taking to heart by the colonists (Rothbard, 1976, 166-170, Middlekauff, 2005, 166).

19

The Sons of Liberty continued to be active, and tensions deepened throughout the
colonies. A prime example is the Boston Massacre of 1770, where British troops fired
onto an unruly crowd, killing five persons. The colonists were outraged, and the
massacre confirmed their mistrust of Britain. Eventually all of the Townshend Acts were
repealed excepting the tea tax (Middlekauff, 2005, 169).

The Tea Act of 1773 was meant to help the British East India Tea company by allowing
the shipping of tea directly to the 13 colonies rather than having to pass through British
ports. This Act did not incur any extra expenses for the colonists but, in the shadow of the
Townshend Acts, the colonists took offense (Middlekauff, 2005, 225). Moreover the
local tea merchants saw a loss of trade for themselves. The colonists saw the matter as a
malicious Parliament trying once again unjustly to assert its will and control. The Sons
of Liberty went into action through protests and newspaper articles. Mass meetings were
held to discuss the situation. In Philadelphia and New York the Sons of Liberty and their
supporters stopped the tea ships from landing their cargos. In Boston, the ships were
refused the right to unload their tea. Eventually the Sons of Liberty performed what is
known as the Boston Tea Party dumping all the tea into harbor. The British Parliament
was inflamed by this insubordination – seeing the colonies becoming more unruly, and
coming to fear that they would cease to be a profitable part of the union (Middlekauff,
2005, 233).

These latter Acts affected equation (3) in much the same way as did the Stamp Act,
though with greater effect. More people felt their rights were being infringed, and that
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the cycle of Parliament continuing to be abusive would continue. The British felt that the
colonies would continue to challenging the will of the Empire. As all this goes on
impatience on both sides increased, shortening T and J: or, at least it did for actors
thinking that the political situation would soon come to a head. As violence and riots
continued, dispute cost continued to fall as the colonists learnt about revolutionary
techniques. Persuasion costs continued to rise as the colonists’ resolve deepened. There
is a vicious circle – the more the union pressured the colonies, the more the 13 colonies
felt threatened and needed to fight back. In the probability of secession, prt, continued to
rise; although we do not yet see it close to being large enough to turn the net economic
rent of secession, E(NER)B, positive. The net return to the union, E(NER)X, from the 13
colonies remains positive but is falling as the colonies are no longer an easy and sure way
to gain tax revenues. In conjunction $xt, the return to the colonies of remaining in the
union, was falling since the colonies are producing increasing amounts of their own
goods under the boycott of British goods. As time passes, incremental increases in the
value of equation (3), together with still positive values of equation (7), are slowly
moving the union and its region B in figure 2 to civil war - out of the stable equilibrium
in the northeast quadrant into the unstable historical episode in the northwest quadrant.

The final series of Acts
In response to the Boston Tea Party, Parliament passed a final series of Acts known in the
colonies as the Intolerable Acts of 1774. In Intolerable Acts included the Impartial
Administration of Justice Act, which moved all Massachusetts trials to other colonies or
to England to keep them “impartial”; the Massachusetts Bay Regulating Act, which made
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all town meetings not approved by the Royal Governor illegal, and made it that law
officials had to be appointed by the Royal Governor. There was also the Boston Port Act,
which closed Boston’s port until the cost of the lost tea was repaid and it moved the
capital to Salem. There was a new Quartering Act, which allowed British troops to stay
in people’s homes and open buildings if no barracks were available22 (Rothbard, 1976,
279, Middlekauff, 2005, 235). All of these Acts were intended to subdue the colonies,
especially Massachusetts. Additionally, more troops were sent and fortifications in
Boston were strengthened. These Acts were felt to be very harsh by the colonists.
Closing of Boston’s port would cost not only Bostonians, but also many other colonists
substantial income. The forbidding of public meetings was seen as a threat to personal
liberty - a taking away of human rights and the Quartering Act as an invasion of privacy
(Middlekauff, 2005, page 266).

For many colonists, these Acts were the “last straw” thinking that their natural rights and
their rights as British citizens were being taken away. In Boston there were more riots.
Mobs closed the courts, and even more (now illegal) meetings were held. Moreover, it
was clear in every colony that whatever Parliament could do to Boston it could do to
them.

Grievance institutionalized
The First Continental Congress was called by the colonists to meet in Philadelphia in
September 1774. The main issues were the violation of rights and no taxation without
22

There was the Quebec Act that gave civil government and religious freedom to Catholics in Quebec. This
proved to be salt in the wounds for the American colonists since they too wanted but had not been granted
such freedoms.
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representation. Trade to and from Britain was stopped. Each colony established a
governing committee that held meetings, raised money for arms and militia, and
coordinated with the other colonies (Middlekauff, 2005, 249 and 271).

The Suffolk Resolves were sent to the King and Parliament stating the colonies’ hatred of
the “murderous” Intolerable Acts. It stated that these Acts were unconstitutional, that
Boston would pay no taxes, and all trade to Britain would be stopped until the Acts were
repealed. This was the last attempt by the colonies to try to negotiate - although many
felt it was a useless. However, most colonists still saw themselves as being British
citizens, and there was no talk of independence yet (Middlekauff, 2005, 250-252).

The empire strikes back
When Parliament learnt of the colonist’ response against the Intolerable Acts, they
decided to react with force. It declared the colonies to be in rebellion. Orders were given
to the Governor of Massachusetts to use force to arrest the leaders of the Congress and to
stop the militia by capturing its arms and supplies.

The stage was set for the Battle of Lexington and Concord. When the colonial spies
heard that the British would move on Concord they called up the militia and set watch to
see when and how the British would come.23 When the British troops met April 5th,
1775, with the waiting militia in Lexington, the long-standing tension in the colonies
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When the troops were dispatched April 4th 1775, two lanterns were hung in the Old North Church in
Boston to signal that the British would come by sea. Paul Revere and others made their famous ride to
warn the militias to get ready, and for the congressional representatives to escape.
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snapped. The colonies and the British engaged in battle all the way to Concord and back
to Boston (Middlekauff, 2005, 272-6).

Civil war - prologue
This was the first point in time when equation (3), net economic rent for the colonies,
E(NER)B, tipped into being negative. With net economic rent for the union remaining
positive for now the stage was set for civil war. The system had moved from the stable
equilibrium in the northeast of figure 2 into the unstable equilibrium in the northwest
quadrant. The Intolerable Acts had pushed the colonists’ resentment over this tipping
point. The colonists were now thinking in the short term: life cannot go on as it is. T had
shortened, and what otherwise would have been a long series of positive economic rents
from remaining in the union (theoretically out to infinity) was severely truncated.

Moreover, there was an increase in the colonist’s rate of time preference as their
impatience had increased. The correspondingly higher value of r discounted the expected
rents from remaining in the union, $xt, into smaller values than formerly. Interestingly,
the closing of the port of Boston would have had an affect opposite to what Parliament
must have expected - because the return from remaining in the union, $xt, had fallen.

The forgoing events had almost certainly increased the probability of secession, prt,
probably quite markedly. The net affect of these events was, therefore, to increase net
economic rent of secession, E(NER)B. The return from remaining in the union was also
adversely affect by the loss of the rights to local trials and freedom to hold meetings. The
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colonist’s dispute costs had also suddenly subjectively dropped since there was a
markedly higher degree of cohesion among them; they had created action committees,
armed militias, and they had trained militarily together.

In the meantime the British remained committed to maintaining the union. However, in
1775 there might have been an awareness that the union’s persuasion cost had increased
owing to the incipient organization of resistance by the colonists. Moreover, the return
from retaining the 13 colonies, ($RENT)X, may have been perceived as having fallen – the
Quartering Act was of course an attempt to shift some of the costs of empire onto the
colonists.

It is important to note that despite the events leading up to the war, persuasion cost even
in 1775 or 1776 for Britain was still low, because it had a large well trained, and
technologically advanced army and navy. Britain was also financially capable of fighting
a war, and it could afford to hire mercenaries.24 At the start of the Revolutionary war,
Parliament was eager to reassert its dominance. It was weary of petitions and the unruly
colonists. It believed the fight would be short and easy.

A drawback however was that Britain had to move its troops across the Atlantic – a factor
in persuasion cost. However, since the Royal Navy ‘ruled the waves’, even this was not
so great a great cost to subdue those that had ‘waived the rules’. In order further to
reduce persuasion cost, the British enlisted the help of Native Americans and offered
freedom to any slaves who would join the cause.
24

Such as the German Hessians.
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The colonist’s dispute costs were still high since they have no standing army and the
militias were still far from being well organized. Moreover, once they got an army most
of it was untrained, undisciplined and inexperienced. They also had very little by way of
supplies including weapons, clothing, shoes, food, and other necessities. They lost
several battles - such as Bunker Hill, mainly because they had run out of ammunition.
They had no navy, having always relied on the Royal Navy. Nor was there an effective
supreme ruling body capable of raising taxes for the war effort. This came only gradually
beginning in May 1775 with the first meeting of the Second Continental Congress; and
even then, each of the thirteen colonies was not mandated to support the war. Finances
were therefore thin to nonexistent. Troops went unpaid for years - from the lowliest
recruit up to George Washington himself.

However, the colonists had some advantages. One was that they were fighting on home
ground; they knew the terrain well, and had a tactical advantage. They could also obtain
supplies from nearby towns and farms. They were also in some large part woodsmen and
sharpshooters. Nor for the most part did they play by normal rules of war - which
confused the British and make it hard for them to fight. Most importantly, they were full
of patriotic zeal, defending their homeland, and willing to risk everything to keep their
rights, liberties and way of life. All of these advantages simultaneously reduced dispute
cost for the colonist and raised persuasion cost for the British.
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Autonomy within the Empire?
After the battles of Lexington and Concord the Second Continental Congress met to
create, organize, and finance an army. They also drafted the Olive Branch Petition as one
last hope for peace. This was sent to King George asking for autonomy within the British
Empire; but this was refused. The colonists then named George Washington Commander
of the Colonial Army (Middlekauff, 2005, 284-287). With the creation of a unified body
to make decisions and an army, dispute costs will have fallen even more.

More battles
Around this time, there were two major events. First, the capture of supplies by the
colonials from Fort Ticonderoga, which gave them control of the area around Boston,
bottling the British in. Second, the Battle of Bunker Hill (June, 1775). Bunker Hill was
one of the first major conflicts of the Revolutionary War, and was fought to protect
nearby Boston harbor.25 Even though this battle was a loss for the colonists, it was a huge
moral victory. It showed them that they were an equal match for the British. This greatly
helped lower dispute costs, ($dispute cost)t, while raising persuasion cost, ($persuasion
cost)t, for the British - who had until then anticipated an easy war and a rapid victory
(Middlekauf, page 298). Moreover, the probability of secession in the minds of both the
colonists, prt, and the British, Prt must both have risen.
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The battle lasted for two days with the colonists fortified on top of Breed’s Hill. Although the British
eventually took the hill, they suffered heavy casualties. The Colonists had only retreated when they ran out
of ammunition.
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Thomas Paine, identity and grievance26
Another factor promoting the desire to fight for secession occurred in January 1776 when
Thomas Paine’s Common Sense was published. Paine called the colonist’s connections
to Britain ‘illusions’. He said that their rights were not founded in their connection to
Britain and its constitution, which was obviously corrupted by tyrants. Until this point it
was Parliament that was viewed negatively, with the King at their mercy, but Paine
focused on the King and the evils of monarchy. He argued that Americans could not
hope for reconciliation, and that any compromise would lead to deterioration of
American life. He also used the recent battles and bloodshed as proof that the ties to the
motherland had already been severed. The effect of this document cannot be overstated.
Common Sense showed Americans that independence was not merely an option; it was
both necessary and inevitable. Prior to this, independence had barely been on the table,
but now the colonists could see that they were participating in an important historical
moment (Rothbard, 1976, 137-139, Middlekauff, 2005, 325-6).

Our interpretation is that Common Sense shifted equations (3) or (4), E(NER)B, to be even
more negative mainly because it raised the perceived value of independence, ($rent)t,
and, by making the situation crystal clear to an ever wider American audience, raised the
probability of secession, prt . Moreover, it is reasonable to argue that the tract made the
colonists even more impatient for secession, so raising their rates of time preference, r.
The Declaration of Independence had become all but inevitable. Paine’s book had
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Of course, Paine was not alone as a pamphleteer. Bailyn (1992) says that over 400 pamphlets were
published by between 1750 and 1776 by Americans on colonial-British relationships (page 8). He also
writes that Common Sense “was a superbly rhetorical and iconoclastic pamphlet…an immediate sensation”
(page 286).
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increased nationalism, and instilled Americans with a desire to fight for their rights
against tyrants, to secede from the union, and to govern themselves. It can also be argued
that dispute cost had been further lowered - the inspired Americans were willing to ‘bear
any burden’ in a fight for an independent homeland.

The struggle for a new historical equilibrium
Of course, the war of secession had already begun, and in our economic model this is
evidence of a positive E(NER)B. The struggle was then on to find a new historical
equilibrium: either the British would be successful in turning the American’s E(NER)B
negative once again, in which case empire would be re-established; or the colonists
would succeed in turning E(NER)X negative - in which case a new equilibrium would be
reached in the southwest corner of figure 2 - the civil war would come to an end and a
peace treaty would allow secession.

In June 1776, Richard Henry Lee proposed Independence and on July 4th the Declaration
of Independence was adopted, being signed August 2nd. It was now an all out war of
secession. There were practical reasons for declaring independence besides patriotism.
As an independent country, the colonies could get financial and military help from other
counties;27 trading partners outside of the Empire could be found; and being unified
against the Empire helped in coordination and funding. Together these things lowered
the all-important dispute costs (Middlekauff , 2005, 333 and 372).
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The Continental Congress believed the war could not be won without the help of France. Benjamin
Franklin was dispatched to France to start negotiations.
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Dispute cost versus persuasion cost
At this point we can view the war as a contest between the level of dispute cost and
persuasion cost played out on the battlefield - with each side trying to raise the
corresponding cost of the other side while containing its own. With each battle, the
equations, in particular (3) and (7), shifted one way or another. With the British
attempting turn equation (3) once again negative, and the colonists trying to do the same
to equation (7). Dispute cost would rise with too many battles lost, shortage of troops
with which to fight, high death tolls, loss of will to fight, or, lack of finance, resources,
or, supplies. If these dispute costs became too great to bear, the secessionists would lose E(NER)B < 0. Conjointly, persuasion cost could rise for the same set of reasons; and if
E(NER)X turned negative Britain would stop fighting, so letting secession happen.

The Americans had a victory at Montreal in late-1775, but suffered a defeat at Quebec.
The British evacuated Boston in March 1776 due to lack of supplies, boosting American
moral. However, in August, 30,000 British troops arrived in New York and went on to
win the Battle of Brooklyn, soon afterwards fortifying the city. This was a major blow to
the Americans, who were nearly destroyed in the battle.

Through the rest of 1776, the American army under Washington fought and retreated,
and fought and retreated. The northern army under Benedict Arnold lost the battle of
Lake Champlain in October. The British captured Fort Washington, NY, and Fort Lee,
NJ, in November. Dispute costs were rising as morale fell. The American army was not
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being paid much, if at all, and many soldiers chose only to fight in the summer months.
The British were doing quite well, winning territory, although the war was going on
longer than expected. Persuasion cost appears therefore to be dropping with each victory.
However, the main colonial army was never destroyed (Middlekauff, 2005, 346, 525,
558).

Just when it looked as though the dispute cost would be too much for the Americans to
bear, two events saved their war effort. Thomas Paine published The American Crisis, a
document that helped rekindle the patriotic fires in the hearts of Americans who were on
the verge of giving up. It urged them to stay the course through the trying times. In
addition, the Americans won Battle of Trenton in December 1776.28 This battle provided
a much-needed ‘pick-me-up’ for the troops and and captured supplies and ammunition.
Without this victory, it is doubtful the American army would have lasted much longer.
After Trenton George Washington changed his strategy, deciding that the Americans
would just have to survive long enough for the British to give up the fight (Rothbard,
1976, 197-199, Middlekauff, 2005, 363).

1777 was another year of major ups and downs on both sides of the war.29

An important

victory came for the Americans when British General Burgoyne surrendered to American
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This is the battle with Washington’s famous crossing of the Delaware and the first major victory for the
American army. The Americans crossed the river on Christmas Eve and surprised a drunk and sleeping
group of Hessian mercenaries to take the town of Trenton. The battle was short, and the Americans
captured 900 prisoners, before marching on and capturing the town of Princeton, successfully pushing the
British out of New Jersey.
29
The British won many battles including the Battle of Brandywine and the Capture of Fort Ticonderoga.
The British won a very decisive victory at Germantown, and dealt a blow to the Americans by capturing the
acting capital of Philadelphia. They also captured nearby forts, and effectively secured their position in
Philadelphia and along the Delaware River. Despite the victories, the Congress escaped and the American
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General Gates at Saratoga, NY, in October, ending British hopes of a two-pronged attack
isolating New England from the rest of the colonies (Middlekauff, 2005, 387, 396, 398,
393). At the end the year, Washington wintered in the now famous Valley Forge. This
was a critical time for the colonial army as it helped shift the tide of the war. Thanks to
the leadership of Washington and the training of the troops by Baron von Steuben a
Prussian drill sergeant, the American army was well trained and hardened into seasoned
veterans by the time it came to break camp in June 1778. Now the colonial army was a
match for the British regulars - dispute cost had fallen again while drastically raising
British persuasion cost (Middlekauff, 2005, 417).

There were more back and forth victories in 1778 and 1779.30 However, a major event
helped facilitate the American war effort. Thanks to the efforts of Ben Franklin and the
victory of Battle of Saratoga, France was finally convinced to enter the war against its
long time British enemy in February 1778. This greatly lowered dispute costs and raised
persuasion cost, since France had a navy that could fight the British. As the Americans
relied heavily on trade from other nations for supplies and money, controlling the seas
was essential. Lack of a navy had cost the colonies Philadelphia. Though some ships had
been built and many privateers had been hired, they were no match for the Royal Navy.
With France in the fight, the Americans now had better chances of winning the war
(Middlekauff, 2005, 411, 534, 459). That is, prt increased. In 1779, America actually won

army remained intact. The American flag was sown that year, which gave even more patriotic strength to
the hearts of the struggling American soldiers.
30
The armies fought to a standstill at the battle of Monmouth. The Battle was a moral boots in part for the
Americans. During the battle, they employed advanced strategic and tactical maneuvers, proving that they
had learned to become a top-notch army. The British captured Savanna Georgia and reeked havoc on the
south.
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a major naval battle. John Paul Jones famously captured a British Man o’war off the coast
of England, giving a much-needed morale boost to the colonies. Later, American George
Rogers Clark captured Vincennes on the Wabash in February of 1779.

In July, both Fairfield and Norwalk, Connecticut, were burned by the British. In addition,
an American attempt to recapture Savanna was defeated (Middlekauff, 2005, 538, 500,
545).

And while 1780 started out well for the British31 by July the French had shown up and
the tide turned.32 With the adoption of the Articles of Confederation in March 1781, the
Americans now had a more fully functioning government and the French fleet drove
British naval force from the Chesapeake Bay in September.33

British persuasion costs were rising steeply now as it was becoming too costly to keep on
sending troops overseas, and there were no major victories at hand. In England people
had become war weary. They had been fighting what should have been a short and easy
war for 5 years. Popular opinion became to leave the colonists to fend for themselves.
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They captured Charlestown, SC, in May, and soon after won another battle nearby at Waxhaw Creek.
The British lost several battles, including King's Mountain in South Carolina where American troops
defeated Maj. Patrick Ferguson and one-third of General Cornwallis' army (Middlekauff, 2005, 618, 467).
In 1781, there were more wins and losses on both sides, but the Americans and their French allies now had
the clear advantage.
33
That same month in a desperate attempt to keep Washington from marching to Yorktown, Benedict
Arnold, now turned traitor, launched an attack from New York on Fort Griswold and Fort Trumbull in the
Battle of Groton Heights. Arnold was victorious and burned much of Groton and New London, CT.
Nevertheless, Washington did not take the bait, but marched on to Yorktown, VA, where the British finally
surrendered in October. (Rothbard, 1976, 282-283, Middlekauff, 2005, 651, 545, 629).
32
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With the union’s defeat at Yorktown, equation (7) - Britain’s net return from the
American colonies, E(NER)X – shifted decisively from positive to negative and
Parliament agreed to sign the Treaty of Paris so officially ending the American war of
secession. With that the American colonies seceded from the union.

Conclusions

We have introduced no new historical facts rather our contribution is in offering a general
model in which known facts can be framed. The advantage of a general model is to
incorporate into a single whole existing but partial historical analysis. We have argued
that in explaining the outbreak and secessionist conclusion of the American Revolution
several clusters of disparate historical events need to be gathered together. There are
those clusters that affect the perceived benefits of secession; those that reduced the
benefits of remaining in the Empire; those that affected the colonists’ impatience with the
status quo; yet other clusters that influenced the perceived probability of secession as
held in the minds of the secessionists; and still more clusters of factors that influenced the
cost of disputing secession with the mother country. Moreover, all of the forgoing
clusters are only on the side of the colonists. Similar clusters relate to the benefits and
costs of retaining the union as viewed by the Empire.

Finally, we are perfectly well aware that we have not come close to discussing all of the
most important historical events surrounding the American Revolution; this is a paper,
not a long book. We have to content ourselves with our offering of a new economic
analysis of the American Revolution in a handful of simple and summary equations.
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